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Abstract
The subjective Everettian approach to quantum mechanics presented by
Deutsch and Wallace fails to constitute an empirically viable theory of quan-
tum phenomena. The decision theoretic implementation of the Born rule
realized in this approach provides no basis for rejecting Everettian quantum
mechanics in the face of empirical data that contradicts the Born rule. The
approach of Greaves and Myrvold, which provides a subjective implementa-
tion of the Born rule as well but derives it from empirical data rather than
decision theoretic arguments, avoids the problem faced by Deutsch and Wal-
lace and is empirically viable. However, there is good reason to cast doubts
on its scientific value.
Keywords: Everett interpretation, Many worlds, Empirical Viability
1. Introduction
The last decade of debate with regard to the interpretation of quantum
theory has seen the ascendance of a particular variant of the Everettian ap-
proach, purported to be free of the problems with probability that beset its
forebears. The essential step in these neo-Everettian approaches comes from
an idea first presented by David Deutsch and then explicated and carried
further by David Wallace. They suggested that a satisfactory Everettian
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interpretation of quantum mechanics could be based on a purely subjective1
emergence of the probabilistic role of the wave function. According to this
understanding, the connection between the wave function and probabilities
does not rely on any objective characteristics of the many worlds scenario
(be it objective probabilities, numbers of branches or other) but is rather
a product of the rational behaviour of agents who find themselves in one
branch of the Everettian universe. Deutsch Deutsch (1999) and later Wal-
lace Wallace (2007, 2009, 2012) demonstrated that, provided that Everettian
quantum mechanics was true, the Born rule could be established under cer-
tain conditions as being constitutive of any rational betting behaviour on
future outcomes of quantum experiments.
This Deutsch-Wallace-Everett (DWE) approach to quantum theory has
not been without its critics. One line of critical response found within the
literature focuses upon the the structure of the decision theoretic proof it-
self, and relies upon either disputing the notion of rationality Price (2010),
or challenging the derivation of the Born rule as a unique/viable subjec-
tive probabilistic measure Lewis (2006); Hemmo and Pitowsky (2007). Such
internal criticisms rest upon implicitly accepting the viability of the DWE
framework but questioning particular aspects of its implementation. Another
important line of criticism seeks to undermine the DWE claim of a derivation
Born rule on the basis of a decoherence related circularity objection Zurek
(2005, 2010); Baker (2007); Kent (2010).
In the present paper, we will not address the question of the internal co-
gency of the selection of rationality criteria nor the problems related to the
decoherence argument. Rather, we will argue that, even if these two points
of criticism are disregarded, the Deutsch-Wallace-Everett programme is af-
flicted by a further exogenous malady owing to a failure to fulfil an essential
condition for being a satisfactory scientific approach: We will claim that the
DWE scheme is fundamentally flawed since it does not offer a basis for reject-
ing Everettian quantum mechanics in the face of evidence that contradicts
the predictions of quantum mechanics.
We begin in Section §2 by briefly outlining the key conceptual steps taken
within the DWE approach towards quantum mechanics. This programme is
1Here the use of ‘epistemic’ rather than ‘subjective’ would perhaps be more consistent
with the terminology in use within the philosophy of science. However, we will retain the
original terminology to avoid confusion
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then, in Section §3, shown to fail to be empirically viable according to our
definition. In §4 we consider a strategy that has been proposed to deal with
the issue of predictions/evidence by Greaves and Myvold Greaves and Myr-
vold (2010). They believe we should explicitly ascribe (non-probabilistic)
primitive weights to branches according to the Born rule and then base this
branch weighting rule upon the empirical evidence we have hitherto taken to
refer to probabilities. We will point out that this strategy departs from DWE
in precisely the respect that any Everettian is at pains to avoid: it introduces
a new rule in order to provide an interpretation of the wave function. Fur-
thermore, it will be argued that this additional structure is of questionable
scientific value, and thus that the Greaves-Myvold approach constitutes a
rather unattractive interpretational option.
2. The Deutsch Wallace Approach
Let us briefly consider the line of reasoning presented by Deutsch and
Wallace. Their starting point is a core problem of the Everettian approach.
Consider an agent who carries out a quantum experiment that can have a
number of different outcomes. Everettian QM relates each outcome to one
branch of the Everettian universe. Since an actual instantiation of our agent
exists in each of those branches, the agent’s chances of finding themselves
in one specific branch after the experiment might be expected to be directly
determined by the number of branches which fork off from the initial state of
the experiment. Closer analysis shows, however, that such branch counting –
in conjunction with the Everettian understanding that the branches emerge
based on decoherence without additional assumptions – cannot coherently
reproduce the probabilities provided by quantum mechanics. (See e.g. Rae
(2009)).
The Deutsch-Wallace strategy Deutsch (1999); Wallace (2007, 2009, 2012)
is to deal with this problem by deploying a double strategy. First, they ar-
gue that it is impossible in principle to extract probability statements on the
outcomes of quantum experiments on the basis of branch counting. Since de-
coherence is fuzzy in the sense that there is no precise way of telling at what
point in time decoherence occurs, it is impossible to specify one definitive
branching structure for a quantum process.2 This in turn implies that no
2We will in this paper neglect the issues inherent within any Everettian invocation of
a decoherence based ontology.
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definitive probabilistic conclusions can be drawn from branch counting. The
DWE approach is then based upon the conclusion that quantum probabilities
cannot be implemented at an objective level in an Everettian framework at
all. The many worlds structure thus must not be understood in terms of a
discrete set of branches where the probability for measuring a specific result
in a quantum experiment can be extracted from the number of alternative
branches which fork off during the experiment. Under the DWE approach
it is then claimed that, once the connection between measurement proba-
bilities and the branching structure is broken, the problem of conceptual
incompatibility between the two is thereby dissolved.
It remains to be shown how measurement probabilities are related to
Everettian QM at all. In a second step, the DWE approach leads us to im-
plement probabilities at a subjective level by introducing a decision theoretic
analysis. We ask the question as to which rational betting strategies are open
to an agent living in a branch of the Everettian world; and then postulate ra-
tionality criteria which are taken to be necessary for coherent reasoning. On
that basis, the claim is that one can show that, up to linear transformations,
applying the Born rule to the amplitudes provided by quantum mechanics
constitutes the only rational betting strategy if one is convinced that Ev-
erettian QM is true.3 The viability of Everettian quantum mechanics as an
adequate description of nature thus is claimed to follow from the rationality
restriction on our betting behaviour.
The implementation of the decision theoretic argument within the DWE
scheme has the following form:
A1: The Everettian perspective on quantum mechanics amounts to noth-
ing more than literally accepting the equations of quantum mechanics (which,
in of themselves, do not imply the probabilistic implementation of quantum
mechanics based on the Born rule).
A2: For an agent who understands themselves as part of an Everettian
universe, the Born rule constitutes the only possible basis for rational betting
on the outcome of quantum processes. If Everettian QM is true, a rational
3As noted above many questions have been raised with regard to the cogency of the
rationality criteria chosen. We will not add to the already substantial literature in this
line.
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scientist thus should apply the Born rule as a probabilistic measure for pos-
sible experimental outcomes.
⇒ C1 Everettian QM predicts that outcomes of quantum experiments
adhere to the Born rule.
O: The predictions which can be extracted from Everettian QM by de-
ploying the Born rule are empirically confirmed by all availlable data.
⇒ C2: Everettian QM must be taken to be a viable description of quan-
tum phenomena at this point.
In the following, we take observation O for granted and, for the sake of the
argument, concede assumptions A1 and A2. We will argue on that basis that
the Deutsch-Wallace argument is fallacious and leads to a misrepresentation
of the actual status of Everettian QM. The crux of the DWE argument lies in
C1. As we will see, calling the fact that rationality enforces a specific betting
behaviour a prediction is highly misleading since it does not accord with the
standard meaning of scientific prediction and is too weak for establishing a
scientific theory’s empirical viability.
3. The Problem of Empirical Viability
To understand the problem faced by the Deutsch-Wallace approach, we
must be clear about the role Everettian QM is supposed to play. Considering
the currently available data, the canonical interpretation of quantum me-
chanics (henceforth called QM) provides an empirically fully viable basis for
calculating non-relativistic quantum phenomena. The conceptual difficulties
of QM do not amount to empirical deficits. Therefore, we expect Everettian
QM to resolve the conceptual difficulties of QM while retaining the empiri-
cally confirmed implications of QM. If Everettian QM fulfils that condition,
we can call it empirically viable with respect to the current empirical status
quo. We know, however, that Everettian QM is not fully empirically equiva-
lent with QM since it allows for recoherence effects which are absent in QM.
Barrett (2011) In order to check the empirical viability of Everettian QM we
thus have to demand empirical equivalence with respect to the available data
while allowing for empirical differences with respect to data that lies beyond
the range of the experiments carried out up to this point. In other words, we
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must require that Everettian QM meets the standard of empirical viability
set by QM with respect to the experiments carried out up to this point.
In the following, we will analyse whether or not Everettian QM as un-
derstood by Deutsch and Wallace can be called an empirically viable theory
in the described sense. To that end, let us further specify the conditions
which have to be fulfilled in order to acknowledge that a scheme S meets the
standard of empirical viability set by some theory T. We can immediately
state a simple condition that is necessary without any doubt:
I1: A scheme S meets the standard of empirical viability set by a theory
T only if S is not refuted by the collected empirical data that confirms T.
This condition seems fulfilled by the Deutsch-Wallace-Everett (DWE)
approach to quantum mechanics. Given that recoherence effects are too
small for being observable in present day experiments, Everettian QM does
not contain any empirical implications at variance with QM that can be
contradicted by the available empirical data. Thus so far as I1 goes DWE
has no problems. However, a simple example can show that this condition
fails to exclude all classes of theories that are obviously not empirically viable.
Let us consider Newtonian mechanics and compare it to a scheme SN that
assumes that objects move freely in space without following any deterministic
or probabilistic equations of motion. According to I1, we could say that this
theory meets the standard of empirical viability set by Newtonian mechanics.
After all, since SN gives no predictions regarding the movements of objects at
all, it cannot offer any predictions which contradict Newtonian mechanics. It
is obviously absurd, however, to say that SN meets the standard of empirical
viability set by Newtonian physics, and there is a clear reason why: if objects
were found to move in space in disagreement with Newton’s laws, that would
contradict Newtonian physics but would not contradict SN. Therefore, we
clearly can distinguish empirically between the two schemes and must call
Newtonian mechanics the by far stronger theory.
In order to exclude examples like the one presented above, we thus need
one more condition. A very plausible choice is:
I2: A scheme S meets the standard of empirical viability set by a theory
T only if any data that could have been collected in experiments which have
been carried out in the past and would have refuted theory T would also
have refuted S.
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The question is then whether or not the DWE approach to quantum
mechanics satisfies I2.
As has been noted in the literature (see e.g. Kent (2010)), the DWE
approach does not give us an objective basis for predicting the results of
quantum measurements. Any outcome of a quantum process that does not
contradict non-statistical laws is represented by a branch in the many worlds
structure – and since all branches in a many worlds scenario are taken to be
real, no objective selections of individual branches take place. Furthermore,
as we have seen above, proponents of the DWE approach explicitly emphasise
that no probabilities of measurement outcomes can be extracted from branch
counting. Therefore, every pattern of outcomes of a quantum experiment
that is not strictly forbidden by the laws of quantum mechanics is fully
consistent with the DWE scheme and thus fully plausible at an objective
level.
Proponents of the DWE scheme assert, however, that their approach to
quantum mechanics implies the use of the Born rule in bets on empirical
outcomes since no other betting behaviour is rational. This subjective im-
plementation of quantum probability in some sense amounts to the claim
that the Everettian approach makes roughly the same predictions about the
outcome of quantum experiments as QM. In Chapter 6 of his book Wal-
lace (2012), David Wallace explicitly asserts that the ‘predictions’ of DWE
provide the basis for falsifying Everettian QM in the face of evidence that
contradicts them. In his terms, Wallace claims that DWE has an answer
to the ‘unknown theory problem’. In the following, we shall argue that this
assertion is mistaken.
Let us imagine that recent quantum experiments had provided empirical
data that were significantly incompatible with the statistical predictions of
QM. By this we mean experimental results which did not violate the non-
probabilistic laws of quantum mechanics but which were assigned a vanish-
ingly small probability by the theory. A consistent (and diverse) sequence of
such experimental results would eventually have lead the scientific commu-
nity to accept that QM had been refuted.
How would the DWE scheme have been affected by the described empir-
ical evidence? In principle, one could hope to implement falsification at two
levels.
First, one might think that the collected data falsified the claim that
one should use the Born rule in Everettian quantum mechanics. That is,
the data might not suggest the falsity of Everettian QM per se but rather
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the inadequacy of the decision theoretic argument that implies the use of
the Born rule. This does not work, however, since, according to DWE, the
decision theoretic analysis itself does not rely on empirical data at all. It is
based on the assumption of the truth of Everettian QM and introduces a set
of allegedly cogent and indubitable general principles of rationality. Logical
analysis then leads to the statement that applying the Born rule is the only
rational betting behaviour for an agent in a branch of the Everettian world.
The logical analysis seems unassailable and clearly cannot be refuted by
empirical evidence. The assumed rationality principles are more contentious
and have indeed been criticized by a number of observers Price (2010); Kent
(2010) as arbitrary and unjustified. The exponent of DWE, however, in order
not to abandon those principles and thereby the entire subjectivist approach
from the start, must uphold them even in the face of false predictions made
on their basis in the context of some scientific theory. If she was ready to take
them to be empirically refuted as soon as the first scientific anomaly has been
derived on their basis, they would be downgraded to empirical speculations
and therefore become utterly useless.
This means, that one can only hope to find falsification of DWE with
respect to structural elements of Everettian QM itself. But this leads us
back to an analysis of the objective structure of Everettian QM. We know
already that the DWE scheme does not provide objective probabilities for
outcomes of experiments and therefore cannot be refuted by experimental
data on that basis (provided that data is not strictly forbidden by the laws
of quantum mechanics). We thus have no basis for the claim that structural
elements of Everettian QM are falsified by the given data either. We must
conclude that the considered data do not falsify Everettian QM at all.
At first sight, it may seem paradox that DWE ‘predicts’ data but empir-
ical results which contradict those predictions do not falsify the theory. The
situation becomes clear once one compares conventional predictions with
‘predictions’ as deployed in DWE based on a reconstruction in terms of
hypothetico-deductivism. In conventional cases, the (statistical distribution
of) empirical data to be found in experiments can be deduced from the theory.
A contradiction between predicted and observed data thus implies that ei-
ther the statement specifying the collected data or the theory is false. DWE,
to the contrary, only asserts that statements about the rationality of betting
behaviour can be deduced from Everettian QM. No deductive step is avail-
able that leads from the statement that only betting on a specific statistical
data distribution is rational to the statement that this distribution will in
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fact be found in experiments. Therefore, the observation of contradicting
data does not imply that either the theory or the statement about observed
data is false. No falsification can occur.
In order to characterise the kind of fallacy involved in DWE reasoning, let
us look at a toy example that has nothing to do with quantum physics. Let
us assume a slightly modified form of Pascal’s wager. Imagine that man has
studied religion quite a lot and came up with the following heaven-theory:
if there is life after death, the one who bets on it before death will get a
million Pounds start capital in afterlife (heaven seems to be British) while
the one who bets against it will get just one Pound. (Agnostics get nothing.)
However, the chances that afterlife exists are just one over a million. Since
no money can be received by the agent if afterlife does not exist, the only
rational betting behaviour in the given scenario is betting on the existence
of afterlife. Still, once the voice of god at the time of death tells you: ‘sorry,
no afterlife’, your last thought should not be: ‘So heaven-theory was false.’
It should rather be: ‘Given heaven-theory, I’m not surprised. After all, there
is no logical implication that leads from the specification of rational betting
behaviour to factual statements on the subject of betting.’
DWE thus gives us no justification at all for withdrawing the predictions
according to the Born rule in the face of data that disagrees with the Born
rule. The objective implications of DWE do not involve the Born rule and
thus cannot be at variance with the new data; and the predictions extracted
at the subjective level which do involve the Born rule are not based on
empirical data and therefore cannot be refuted by it. We thus must conclude
that DWE would not have been refuted by a large class of data that would
have refuted QM. The form of prediction provided by DWE does not amount
to scientific prediction as defined by refutability by data that is at variance
with the prediction. DWE thus does not meet the standard of scientific
viability set by QM.4
The defender of DWE might try to rescue the general DWE scheme by
making a minor amendment. They might introduce an additional rationality
principle P that consists in the requirement that bets on future outcomes may
only be placed as long as they do not stand in conflict with predictions based
4Note, in particular, that the presented conclusion blocks Occham’s razor arguments for
favouring Everettian QM over other interpretations of QM. If the Everett interpretation
does not meet the standards of empirical viability of canonical QM, Occam’s razor is no
argument for favouring it over the latter.
9
on cogent inductive reasoning. Once principle P is added, the defender of
DWE might argue, bets according to the Born rule are not rational any more
in the presence of significant empirical deviations from QM. The viability of
the DWE predictions thus can be refuted by empirical data after all.
But rather than solving the problem, this step shows the precarious char-
acter of the decision theoretic argument even more clearly. Let us assume
that recent quantum experiments showed a specific pattern of deviations
from QM predictions. To have a nice simple example, let us imagine that
one found a certain radioactive isotope that decayed according to a specifi-
able statistical rule R that was at variance with the Born rule. The extended
rationality conditions would imply that there is no rational betting behaviour
with respect to the decay of that isotope. The only rational option based on
the DWE rationality conditions would be betting according to the Born rule;
but principle P renders this strategy rationally excluded in the given case.
Any agent who followed basic principles of scientific reasoning and had the
slightest experience in betting, however, would judge the observed pattern
of incoming data based on the available background information and then
know how to bet accordingly. Agents believing in Everettian QM in particu-
lar would adhere to the following line of reasoning: Everettian QM does not
make objective predictions which contradict the observed pattern of data; on
these grounds there is no reason for being less convinced of Everettian QM
after the data than before; the data allows for immediate inductive predic-
tions concerning the outcomes of future experiments based on the rule R;
therefore, one should bet accordingly. Abstaining from this strategy would
contradict the principle of inductive reasoning and therefore would be at vari-
ance with scientific thinking. In other words, the DWE rationality principles
are incompatible with scientific thinking and therefore cannot be accepted
as a foundation of scientific reasoning. Betting must always be carried out
according to inductive reasoning. As long as that strategy is consistent with
the DWE principles of rationality, the latter can be upheld. As soon as it
differs from them, the DWE principles can only be defended at the price of
abandoning scientifically implied forms of reasoning.
To conclude, the subjectivist approach of DWE does not make Everettian
quantum mechanics a viable description of our world. Its failure in that re-
spect can be stated in two different ways. First, if one endorses the ratio-
nality principles stated by DWE as universally valid, the DWE approach to
Everettian QM does not meet the standards of empirical viability set by QM.
And second, if one understands the principle of inductive reasoning as a core
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element of rationality, the rationality principles suggested by DWE become
irrelevant because they can only be upheld as long as the betting strategy
they imply is being enforced anyway by the principle of inductive inference.
4. Branches, Weights, and Evidence
4.1. The Greaves-Myrvold approach
The final argument of Section §3 has demonstrated that DWE does not
provide a satisfactory mechanism of confronting Everettian QM with empiri-
cal evidence. In this section we will consider an approach towards subjectivist
Everettian QM that is specifically designed to address the problem of em-
pirical evidence. This approach, due to Greaves and Myrvold (2010) shares
with the DWE scheme the understanding that the statistical character of
quantum mechanics cannot be established at an objective level but at the
same time accepts the need to infer the Born rule from empirical data.5 To
that end, Greaves and Myrvold, use a decision theoretic argument very much
in the style of Deutsch and Wallace, but within a different context: that of
theory confirmation by empirical evidence.
Greaves and Myrvold emphasise that quantum physicists must at any rate
account for the observed statistical pattern of quantum measurements and, as
scientists, must inductively apply that information in order to predict future
outcomes. (Thereby, they acknowledge the additional ‘rationality principle’
formulated at the end of Section §3.) On that basis, quantum physicists
observe that the relative frequency data they collect are in agreement with
the Born rule and therefore accept that rule. Greaves and Myrvold argue
that the adoption of the Born rule should be motivated by the Everettian on
the described evidential basis and be implemented within the framework of
an Everettian branching structure by attributing weights between 0 and 1 to
individual branches accordingly. These weights correspond to the predicted
probabilities of measurement outcomes but do not constitute probabilities
themselves. Rather, they just serve as primitive indicators of quantitative
predictions. Thus, the Greaves-Myrvold strategy involves the substitution
5The reader is referred to Greaves (2007) for an interesting precursor to the Greaves
and Myrvold analysis. The difference between that approach and the later treatment
considered here are not significant for our purposes.
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for – rather than explanation of – the usual connection between observed
evidence and probabilistic dynamical structure. The claim is that:
[An] agent will regard relative frequency data from repeated
experiments as informative about values of branch weights in ex-
actly the same way that, on the usual view, they are informative
about chances of outcomes. (p.7)
and that:
[G]iven reasonable constraints on an epistemic agent’s pref-
erence between wagers, she will act as if she believes that there
are physical branch weights, analogous to physical chances, that
can be estimated empirically in the same way that chances are,
and that observation of events to which a theory assigns high
branch weight boosts rational credence in a branching theory in
the same way that observation of events to which a theory assigns
high chance boosts rational credence in a chance theory. (p.28)
The approach is subjectivist because it does not provide an interpretation
of the branch weights within the context of the objective Everettian branch-
ing structure. The branch weights only acquire meaning with respect to
an individual agent in an individual branch, where they denote the agent’s
probabilistic expectations qua betting behaviour. Significantly, the proba-
bilistic expectations of the agent are not understood as being in any way
connected to the occurrence or not of the relevant outcomes since, as in any
Everettian style picture, all outcomes will occur. This means that, as noted
by Albert (2010), under the Greaves-Myrvold analysis, ‘the business of decid-
ing how to bet is just a matter of maximising the payoffs on those branches
that I happen to care most about’ and has ‘nothing whatsoever to do with
guessing at whether or not [an event] is going to occur’ (p.364) [italics in
the original]. This facet of the approach is certainly unusual – customarily
we would expect any account of scientific theory confirmation to be based
upon the theories ability to make reliable predictions of the occurrence of
events rather than robust guidelines to branch weight based betting. How-
ever, it would be unfair to see this crucial shift as an underhand move: as
seen from the quotes above Greaves and Myrolvd are at pains to be explicit
about their radical departure from our usual notion of confirmation – and it
surely is not legitimate to simply reject the scheme simply on the grounds
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of its strangeness. Nevertheless, questions as to whether or not Greaves and
Myrvold have stretched the concepts of betting and evidence too far past
the customary meanings to remain viable, certainly constitute a valid line of
objection – and in this sense there is certainly a case to answer in the face
of the (rather trenchant) criticisms of Albert (2010). For discussion of such
issues as well as possible adaptations of Greaves-Myrvold scheme in the face
of them, see Tappenden (2011). However, for the purpose of this paper –
and in continuity with our discussion of DWE above – we will concede the
internal conceptual coherence of the scheme in order to focus upon external
issues; in particular the legitimacy of the Greaves-Myrvold approach within
the Everettian family.
4.2. Empirically viable but no longer viably Everettian
Greaves and Myrvold take their approach to be consistent with DWE, and
envisage their work as a supplement to that of Deutsch and Wallace which
provides a framework for theory confirmation in a branching (although not
necessarily Everettian) universe. This understanding is in agreement with
Wallace’s own perspective, who points out at the end of Chapter 4 in Wallace
(2012) that the decision theoretic argument may be seen as a more thorough
explanation of the validity of the Born rule, which could in principle also be
inferred from the collected data based on inductive reasoning. Essentially,
what was demonstrated in Section §3 of this paper is that the rationality
criteria suggested by DWE cannot be reconciled with a full commitment to
inductive reasoning. Our argument thus contradicts Wallace’s claim that
‘specific predictions within Everettian quantum mechanics can be confirmed
or refuted in the same way as for non-Everettian theories’ (Wallace, 2012,
p.210). Inversely, on our account, an agent deliberating within the framework
of Greaves and Myrvold can not simultaneously operate within the framework
of DWE since their fundamental decision principles will conflict. Let us
therefore proceed to investigate how the Greeves-Myrvold approach fares as
an alternative approach to Everettian QM in its own right.
Significantly for our purposes, the account of Greaves and Myrvold would
appear to have a substantial empirical advantage over the DWE approach.
According to Greaves and Myrvold the overall scheme that should be held
by the quantum physicist is constituted by the objectively stated structure
of Everettian QM in conjunction with the empirically established attribution
of branch weights according to the Born rule. That overall scheme is empiri-
cally indistinguishable from QM with respect to the currently available data.
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Moreover, data that deviated significantly from the Born rule would have re-
futed the Greaves-Myrvold scheme in the same way as it would have refuted
QM. In this sense, Greaves and Myrvold, unlike Deutsch and Wallace, have
managed to formulate a theory that meets the standard of empirical viability
set by QM. They have done so, however, at a very high cost. Let us take one
step back to put the move by Greaves and Myrvold into context.
Everettian QM was originally proposed in order to keep the equations
of quantum mechanics free from additional principles which established the
relation between the wave function and the stochastic character of empirical
data - and its modern defenders take this feature to be one of its principal
strengths. Canonical ‘Copenhagen’ QM introduces the collapse of the wave
function and then relates the statistics of empirical data to the stochastic
characteristics of the collapse. Bohmian QM introduces (non-local) hidden
parameters and relates the statistics of empirical data to the initial conditions
of particles. Through the Everettian approach, it is claimed that quantum
mechanics can do without any additions. The statistics of empirical data
should follow just from the pure unitary dynamics of the wave function.
This central Everettian claim thus is a very significant one and, if vindicated,
would constitute a clear strengthening of the status of quantum mechanics.
As we have seen, however, a straightforward deduction of the Born rule
from the dynamics of the wave function has turned out not to be achievable
in the context of a many worlds type approach. It is for this reason Deutsch
and Wallace made the step from the objective to the subjective level. They
said: even if we cannot deduce the Born rule from what Everettians take
to be the objective many worlds structure of the universe, we can show
that applying the Born rule is not a contingent choice for an agent in one
of the branches of the universe. It is the only rational strategy available
and therefore does not have to be derived at an objective structural level.
Deutsch and Wallace therefore retain the strength of Everettian QM as an
approach that does not introduce any physical posits beyond the equations
of quantum mechanics. We have seen in the previous section, however, that
this approach fails because, in the end, it does not lead to an empirically
viable theory.
Greaves and Myrvold suggest that we just take into account the empirical
data and establish the Born rule on that basis subjectively. In doing so, how-
ever, they surrender a core claim of Everettian QM: that we can deduce the
full phenomenology from the dynamics of the wave function without any ad-
ditional assumptions. For their scheme to work, Greaves and Myrvold must
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make the additional assumption that our observations in quantum physics
are in accordance with Born weights attributed to branches. The introduc-
tion of this assumption unquestionably amounts to supplementing the bare
formalism with additional structure and thus a failure to retain the prima fa-
cie most attractive feature of Everettian quantum mechanics. Under Greaves
and Myrvold’s approach, the equations of quantum mechanics can no longer
be claimed to yield their own interpretation.
Furthermore, explanatorily the additional structure they introduce is re-
markably uninteresting. Whereas, for example, in dynamical collapse or
Bohmian models, additional structure is introduced such that a plausible ba-
sis for the statistical characteristics of our observations is rooted in the struc-
tural characteristics of quantum mechanics, Greaves and Myrvold merely
introduce a module that is entirely phenomenal in character and stays inde-
pendent of all objective structural aspects of the theory. The phenomenal
implications of this module could in fact be tuned at will in order to fit the
empirical data without affecting our understanding of the theory’s objective
structure. If an agent observed a different statistics than the one implied by
the Born rule, then they could fix the weights accordingly and thus establish
that statistics as a rule; if they observed no discernible statistical pattern at
all, then they could conclude that the weights do not follow any discernable
pattern and thus refrain from predicting anything – all without changing the
meaning of any objective structural properties of Everettian QM. Greaves
and Myrvold in effect say: we just don’t know why the Born rule applies,
so let us simply take it as a primitive fact that it does. Given that most of
what is empirically interesting about quantum mechanics is related to the
Born rule, this amounts to a capitulation. In order to make the subjectivist
approach sensitive to empirical data, Greaves and Myrvold deem it necessary
to turn it into an empty shell.
This point can be illustrated by means of a simple example from classical
statistical physics. Consider an ideal gas at a moderate temperature and
close to thermal equilibrium; and consider an idealised experiment where
the velocities of individual gas molecules are measured. Given a certain
limited degree of accuracy, such measurements would lead to the empirical
observation that the molecules obey a certain probability distribution – i.e.
the Maxwell-Botzmann distribution for the given temperature. The stan-
dard classical mechanical description of such a system according to kinetic
theory would provide an account of the observed distribution in terms of
structural features of the theory itself – i.e. the particular statistical distri-
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bution observed is rooted in the theoretical framework used. Observation of
a statistical distribution at odds with that of Maxwell and Boltzmann would
constitute a refutation of kinetic gas theory.
Let us then consider a scheme SKT which consists of certain of the prin-
cipal assumptions of kinetic theory but does not have sufficient theoretical
structure to derive the full statistical predictions of the theory (Newton’s
force law is missing for example!). Now, let us allow for SKT to contain
a Maxwell-Botzmann ‘phenomenological module’ – analogous to the Born
‘phenomenological module’ that Greaves and Myrvold attached to Everettian
theory – such that we take into account the relevant observed empirical data
in order to establish the Maxwell-Botzmann distribution subjectively as a
belief enforced by rationality constraints upon an inductive scientist. In such
circumstances one would be able to successful predict the behaviour of the
system based upon SKT just as if it were a substantive physical theory.
Moreover, by our criteria I2, SKT would meet the standard of empirical vi-
ability set by kinetic theory since any data that could have been collected in
experiments which have been carried out in the past and would have refuted
kinetic theory would also have refuted SKT.6 However, clearly SKT is of
almost no scientific value precisely because – as in the Greaves-Myrvold case
– it relies upon a phenomenological module that is entirely independent of
all objective structural aspects of kinetic theory and could in fact be tuned
at will in order to fit the empirical data without affecting our understanding
of the theory’s objective structure.
Of course, the Geaves-Myrvold approach to quantum theory differs from
the SKT approach to kinetic theory by constituting a response to a specific
interpretational problem. However, the essential features of both schemes
are the same: the statistical predictions are established based upon an in-
ductive ‘module’ rather than integrated theoretical structure. Although such
strategies may be both coherent and by our lights empirically viable, as con-
tributions to our understanding of the world they are almost entirely without
merit; and improving our understanding of the world arguably is what inter-
pretations of quantum mechanics should be aiming at.
6Refutation of a theory in the given statistical context means that the probability that
the observed data pattern is generated by the theory in question lies below a specified
very small value. In high energy physics, to give an example, a theory counts as refuted if
it disagrees with the data at 5σ confidence level.
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5. Conclusion
The Deutsch-Wallace-Everett approach fails to provide an empirically
viable form of quantum mechanics. Everettian QM based on a subjective
implementation of the Born rule as suggested by Deutsch and Wallace would
be empirically refutable to a far lesser degree than QM per se. Moreover,
the rationality conditions introduced by Deutsch and Wallace would be at
variance with scientific reasoning when confronted with data that violates
QM by being at variance with the Born rule.
Unlike the DWE-scheme, the approach of Greaves and Myrvold, which
relies on extracting the Born rule at a subjective level from empirical data
rather than from rationality principles, is capable of providing an empiri-
cally viable form of quantum mechanics. This approach, however, jettisons
much of what is interesting about interpretations of QM in general (it does
not offer any deeper level explanation of the Born rule at all) and about
Everettian QM in particular (it gives up the Everettian aim to avoid addi-
tional physical posits beyond the equations of quantum mechanics). Thus,
the Greaves-Myrvold approach does not look like a promising step towards
a deeper understanding of quantum physics.
The described dilemma between loosing predictive power in the decision
theoretical framework on the one hand, and deploying inductive reasoning in
a primitive form without deeper entrenchment within the conceptual prin-
ciples of quantum mechanics on the other, seems to be unavoidable once a
subjectivist approach towards Everettian quantum physics has been chosen.
Anchoring part of the predictive power of the theory at the subjective level
isolates that part from the theory’s objective structure and therefore blocks
all chances of relating the corresponding results of inductive inference to
that structure. Decision theoretic arguments, however, are not data-based
and therefore cannot replace inductive reasoning as a basis for empirically
testable scientific predictions. In our understanding, the described dilemma
suggests that, to the extent the Everettian approach may be seen as promis-
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